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Abstract 
We study the effect of hospital market concentration on the quality of patient data 
protection practices. We use approximately 200 reported data breaches in US hospitals 
over the period 2006 - 2011 as a measure of the quality of patient data protection 
practices. We measure market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) and estimate our models by exploiting cross-sectional HHI variation. 
Surprisingly, we find that increased competition is associated with a decline in the 
quality of patient data protection. Our main result indicates that a 100 point increase in 
HHI is associated with a 5% decline in the average count of data breach incidents. The 
results are directionally robust to a number of alternate model specifications. To explain 
our findings, we posit that hospitals in more competitive markets may be inclined to 
shift resources to more consumer visible activities from the less consumer visible 
activity of data protection. 
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Introduction 
The venerable Stanford Hospital recently found itself subjected to negative publicity and a $20 million 
lawsuit due to breach of confidential patient data. A contractor's actions led to the online exposure from 
September 2010 to August 2011 of 20,000 of Stanford Hospital patient records (Sack 2011). Besides 
negative publicity and loss of consumer confidence, there may be stiff financial penalties associated with 
breach of patient data records. In June 2010, five California hospitals were fined $675,000 for breach of 
confidential patient data. These fines were levied despite the fact that some of the hospitals discovered 
these breaches themselves during audit and disclosed the breaches1. 
The privacy of health information is a widely accepted notion in the United States (and many Western 
countries). As of August 2011, legistlation in 46 US states requires hospitals to report data breaches to the 
individuals affected by such breaches. 
We study the effects of firm competition on the quality of patient data protection practices in hospital 
markets. Information security and privacy have generally been important issues in many societies. 
However, the widespread adoption of information and communication technologies since the second last 
decade of the twentieth century has brought information security and privacy to the forefront of societal 
concerns. With businesses now able to electronically collect, store, and distribute vast amounts of data 
about consumers, there is a need to institute proper safeguards to protect consumer information.  
We consider information security and privacy an aspect of firms' overall quality.  We are not aware of any 
studies that assess the impact of market competition on the quality of information security and privacy. In 
addition, economic theory is indeterminate on the effect of competition on the likelihood or severity of 
data breaches at firms.  A researcher can make two competing claims based on economic theory, viz. (i) 
firms with market power may consume their profits and underinvest in activities that thwart data 
breaches, whereas firms facing tough competition may compete on information security quality (ii) firms 
with market power may be less conscious about the cost of less visible activies such as data breaches, 
whereas firms facing tough competition may cut costs on activities that thwart data breaches, as these 
activities are less visible to consumer. As economic theory cannot provide strong guidance, the impact of 
competition on information security is an empirical question. 
The difficulties with modeling the association between market competition and firm's quality decisions 
include properly defining markets, measuring competition, and incorporating appropriate controls. We 
have chosen United States' hospital markets as the context for our study. An obvious advantage of 
hospital markets is that they have relatively crisp geographical boundaries, which facilitate the creation of 
measures of market structure and relevant controls. Moreover, both the issue of competition and patient 
health information privacy within the healthcare markets have been important to consumers, businesses, 
and governments. 
Our study examines the effect of competition in hospital markets on the quality of patient data protection 
practices. We use approximately 200 reported data breaches in US medical facilities over the period 2006 
- 2011 as a measure of quality of patient data protection practices. We use Core Based Statistical Area 
(CBSA) both to define hospital markets and as the primary unit of our analysis. We use the number of 
data breach incident reports as a measure of quality and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a 
measure of competition within each CBSA. We also control for market size, population, population over 
65 years, per capita income, and state-level variation in data breach disclosure laws within each CBSA. We 
also carry out secondary analysis at hospital level, while controlling for hospital specific characteristics 
such as hospital size, number of hospital employees, and so on. 
Surprisingly, we find that increased competition is associated with a decline in the quality of patient data 
protection. Our main result indicates that a 100 point increase in HHI is associated with a 5% decline in 
the average count of data breach incidents. The results are directionally robust to a number of alternate 
model specifications. To explain our findings, we posit that hospitals in more competitive markets may be 
                                                             
1 http://web.archive.org/web/20100822093407/http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/health/2012114943_fines14.ht
ml accessed on September 26, 2011 
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inclined to shift resources to more consumer visible activities from the less consumer visible activity of 
data protection. 
Related Literature 
Economic theory is clear that competition increases quality in regulated markets (with prices above 
marginal costs). When firms set prices and choose quality, the effect of competition on quality is 
ambiguous (Gaynor 2006). Although Medicare regulates a segment of the healthcare market, the overall 
healthcare market is not regulated. In our study, we do not assume that the regulated and non-regulated 
segments are separable. Although our model is informed by economic theory, our study prioritizes 
signifiance and fit of statistical model over economic theory, and lets the data “speak”'. 
There is a vast and growing body of management literature both on electronic data security in general and 
data security within healthcare IT in particular. We cite a few recent and relevant articles.  (Romanosky et 
al. 2011) report that data breach disclosure laws led to a decline in identity theft during the 2002 to 2009 
study period. Using analytical and numerical modeling, (Romanosky et al. 2010) find that data breach 
disclosure laws may increase firm costs but may lower social costs. (Miller et al 2011) paradoxically found 
that encryption of patient data may actually increase publicized data loss. Our study contributes by 
examining the effects of market competition on data losses in healthcare markets. 
As mentioned earlier, theory does not provide a clear-cut answer on how competition would effect IT 
security and data protection quality, both in general markets as well as healthcare markets. The extant 
literature does not address the question of competitive impact on the quality of IT security and data 
protection practices. We empirically examine this question in the context of healthcare markets. 
Data Sources and Variable Construction 
We sourced hospital data breach information from Privacy Rights Clearing House2, a non-profit consumer 
organization with a stated mission of consumer education and consumer advocacy on issues of personal 
privacy. We sourced data for explanatory variables from American Hospital Association (AHA) yearly 
surveys, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Area Resource File (ARF), and Healthcare 
Information and Management Systems Society(HIMSS) 2009 Analytics Database. Table 1 provides 
summary statistics for select variables in our dataset.   
Table  1: Summary Statistics (2006 - 2011)  
 Variable   Mean   (Std. Dev.)  Min.   Max.  
Data Breach Incidents   0.517   (1.385)   0   15  
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)  4022.472   (2477.683)   307.371   10000  
Market Size (Hospital Beds)   2111.536   (3633.667)   99   44120.333  
CBSA Population  653217.139  (1154605.876)   55357   11553017.833  
CBSA Population (eligible for medicare)   92274.541   (147367.708)   4425   1542206  
CBSA Population ( 65 years)   76341.018   (129489.108)   3103   1434894  
Per Capita Income   0495.358   (6057.12)  15748.333  64219.333  
Disclosure Law Effective Days   1732.969   (719.009)   0.001   2974  
N   381 
 
We used Privacy Rights Clearing House as the source of data for data breaches. Our starting dataset 
includes all incidents reported from January 1, 2006 up to August 22, 2011 across all industries, but the 
                                                             
2https://www.privacyrights.org/about_us.htm 
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focus of our study is data breaches at hospitals. First, we only retained data breaches at the hospital level 
and filtered out all other data breach reports including those related to private doctor offices and health 
insurance companies. Second, we programmatically and manually mapped the hospitals to American 
Hospital Association's unique hosptial ID for each hospital with a reported data breach. We constructed 
the following variables, which we use as the dependent variable in a number of our models: 
Incidents: The number of data breach incidents that happened at the hospital and CBSA level during the 
period (2006-2011). The number of incidents at the CBSA is merely an aggregate of all incidents at the 
hospitals within that CBSA. This is a count variable.  
Incident: Whether a data breach incident happened at the hospital and CBSA level during the period 
(2006 - 2011). This is a binary variable.  
Severity: The severity of the data breach coded into three categories, given in Table 2 below in increasing 
order of severity. Severity is an ordinal variable.   Table 2 provides a frequency distribution of the levels of 
severity. 
Number of Records: The number of records that were breached during a single incident. This is a count 
variable.  
Table  2:  Distribution of the Severity of 
Breaches 
Item Number Per cent 
No breach 281 79 
Breach without 
financial 
11 3 
Breach with financial 62 18 
Total 354 100 
  
Figure  1: Distribution of HHI 
We used American Hospital Association (AHA) yearly survey data set to compute the market size and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each CBSA in our study. We note that hospital-beds and patient-
days (and similar measures) are highly correlated so HHI based on any of these measures will not effect 
results. We used the 'number of hospital beds' to define market size as “number of hospital beds" seem to 
be a commonly used market size definition in extant literature. We construct the following variables: 
Market Size:  The total number of hospital beds in a CBSA.  
HHI: The sum of squared market shares for hospitals in CBSA, with market shares computed using 
hospital beds.  
As of August 2010, US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) threshold for “highly concentrated”' markets is 
an HHI of over 25003. Figure 1 shows a histogram of mean HHI, with the HHI=2500 points marked by 
the red vertical line. Figure 1 suggests that most hospital markets are highly concentrated. 
We used ARF to compute CBSA-level demographic information such as population, population older than 
65, population eligible for medicare, and per capita income. The demographics are reported at the county 
level in ARF, which we aggregated to the CBSA level. 
For hospital level analysis, we further augmented our data with hospital IT variables. We used the 
Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society 2009 Analytics Database (HIMSS DB) as a 
                                                             
3 Capps, Dranove: Market Concentration of Hospitals http://www.ahipcoverage.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/ACOs-Cory-Capps-Hospital-Market-Consolidation-Final.pdf. 
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data source on hospital information technology. We found that all hospitals included in the HIMSS DB 
had Electronic Medical Records (EMR) in the year 2009, so we do not include EMR adoption as an 
independent variable in our analysis. The following hospital-level IT variables were used in our analysis: 
FTE:    Full-time equivalent IT employees working at the hospital  
FTE Security:    Full-time equivalent employees working in IT security  
FTE EMR Help:    Full-time equivalent employees working to support Electronic Medical Records  
 
The reporting of data breaches is potentially influenced by mandatory data breach disclosure laws, where 
the legislation is at the geographical states level rather than at the federal level. As the state-level 
legislation was passed at different times, we constructed a control variable “Law Effective Days”, that 
counts the days elapsed since the mandatory disclosure legislation was passed. 
Modeling Framework and Empirical Analysis 
We consider patient data protection an aspect of hospital overall quality. Economic theory does not 
provide clear-cut answers on whether competition will have a positive or negative impact on quality 
within a non-regulated market (such as hospital markets). Popular perception that “competition is good” 
notwithstanding, increased competition may lead to decreased quality in certain circumstances. Empirical 
evidence is also ambiguous (Gaynor 2006). 
Most empirical studies on quality and competition within healthcare employ the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) framework, which assumes a causal link between market structure, firm conduct, and 
industry performance. Market structure is usually measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
whereas firm conduct is either price (if firms have market power) or some measure of firm-chosen quality. 
The specification also includes demand-shifters and cost-shifters as controls (Gaynor 2006). The 
econometric specification usually has the following form:  
  	 
  
  
  
    (1) 
We employ a similar specification in our study. 
We are primarily interested in the association between average count of data breaches and HHI, identified 
through the observed heterogeneity at the CBSA-level. This in turn helps us understand the association 
between firm's data security quality choice in the face of market competition. Our observed dependent 
variable is count of data breaches, which naturally suggests a Poisson regression model (PRM) as our 
basic modeling framework. Due to potential overdispersion, we also estimate negative binomial 
regression models (NBRM)4. For the mean parameters, the Poisson maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) 
is fully robust to distributional misspecification. Poisson MLE also maintains some efficiency properties 
when the distribution is not Poisson (Wooldridge 2002). We use Poisson MLE in software package Stata 
for parameter estimation. 
Market characteristics such as market size, population, average income of the residents, and others may 
affect the number of breaches as well as HHI (e.g. one would expect more data breaches in a CBSA with a 
relatively large population). In our models, we control for these observed market characteristics. To 
further address endogeneity concerns due to omitted variables, we conduct our analysis at the hospital-
level with more controls, especially IT controls, at the hospital level (as described in a later section). We 
are unable to include aggregate measures such as hospital IT adoption at the CBSA-level as it is not 
possible to construct correct aggregate measures due to missing data at hospital-level. 
Our basic modeling framework can be summarized as: 
 !"# ∼ %&# (2) 
                                                             
4NBRM is equivalent to over-dispersed PRM in our setting because of the mean zero assumption on the over-
dispersion parameter. 
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 &# 	 exp*
  
#  
+,-#  
%.#  
/0#1 (3) 
For the overdispersed case, we assume an error 2# with the following relation with &#. We also assume 
32 	 1 (for identification) and a gamma distribution with parameter 5# (Long 1997). 
 &# 	 exp*6
  ln2#1 (4) 
 2# ∼ 95#, 5# (5) 
2 may be viewed as the combined effect of omitted variables (Gourieroux 1984) or a source of randomness 
(Hausman 1984). A likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis : 5 	 0 provides a test for overdispersion 
(Long 1997). 
Main Results 
For our primary results, we use variants of models described in Equations (2), (3), (4), and (5). The 
dependent variable in all of these models is count of data breach incident reports measured at the CBSA-
level. Almost all of the explanatory variables in these models (including the focal predictor HHI) are 
measured at the CBSA level, except that the variable Law Effective Days is measured at the geographical 
state level. We did not include geographical state indicators in these models as we include state-level Law 
Effective Days (linearly dependent on geographical state indicators). The direction of HHI is unaffected 
even if we include state-level indicators and drop Law Effective Days. We estimated the models using 
Stata with observed information matrix (OIM) variance-covariance estimator, and the results in Table 3  
provide a comparison of estimates on various models. The estimates on HHI coefficients are directionally 
similar and statistically significant in all of these models. We find that an increase in HHI is associated 
with a decrease in average count of data breaches. 
Discussion 
Table 4 provides detailed results on model NBRM7, which is essentially the same as model NBRM6. The 
minor difference is that NBRM uses scaled independent variables (HHI, market size, and population) to 
facilitate discussion. We choose Negative-binomial regression model over Poisson regression model as the 
likelihood-ratio test of : 5 	 0  reports a chi-square statistic =
 	 18.22 with %*= A 18.22|1 	 0.000 
providing evidence for overdispersion5.  Column “factor”  in Table 4, reported as 0.949 provides a 
multiplicative interpretation of the variable effects. Surprisingly, we find that a 100 points increase in 
HHI leads to a 5% decrease in average count of data breaches. A more intuitive example to explain the 
estimated coefficient is that the change in market from five equally-sized firms (with  	 2000) to four 
equally-sized firms (with  	 2500) is associated with an approximately 25% decrease in the average 
count of data breaches. 
One plausible explanation for the observed decline in  data protection quality is that with increased 
competition, hospitals allocate more resources to customer observable activities and cut costs on less 
observable activities such as customer data protection. By focusing resources on relatively more 
observable activities, the hospitals tradeoff between current revenue vs. risk of a data breach. 
Economic theory can explain the direction of impact when firms facing competition choose between two 
or more strategic variables (e.g. a more observable quality attribute and a less observable one). Dorfman-
Steiner condition suggests that firms allocate resources depending on the elasticities of strategic variables. 
Dranove and Satterthwaite provide a similar intuition, where they find that better consumer information 
about price than quality has an equilibrium with sub-optimal quality provided by the firm. We can draw 
upon the insights from Dorfman-Steiner condition and Dranove and Satterthwaite when explaining our 
results. Depending on relative elasticities of various aspects of quality, hospitals may shift resources 
between activities related to different aspects of quality (Gaynor 2006). 
 
Table  4: Detailed Results with DV=incidents  
                                                             
5Stata reports chibar2(01)=18.22 and %D 	 0D2 	 0.000 
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    NBRM7        
  b   se  p  factor 
 incidents          
HHI (by 100)  -5.19e-02***  (9.00e-03)  0.00  0.94940 
Size (by 100)  2.20e-03   (6.69e-03)  0.74  1.00220 
Population 
(by 1000) 
 1.86e-04   (2.18e-04)  0.39   
Population 
(over 65 
years, by 
1000)) 
 -4.67e-05   (2.42e-03)  0.98   
Per Capita 
Income 
 2.75e-05   (1.51e-05)  0.07   
Log(Law 
Effective 
Days) 
 -3.38e-02   (2.62e-02)  0.20   
vce   oim        
N   380        
  
A hospital's quality of IT security and data protection is largely invisible to consumers, whereas quality of 
clinical and hotel aspects of the hospital are relatively more observable. It is reasonable to expect that the 
ratio between the data protection quality elasticity of demand and clinical quality elasticity of demand will 
be higher for a monopoly than for firms in competitive markets. This in turn implies that relataively more 
resources will be spent on data security in a monopoly than in competitive markets. Empirically, 
(Mukamel et al. 2002) found that intensifying price competition may lead hospitals to allocate more 
resources to services whose quality customers can more easily evaluate. 
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Table  3: Main Results with DV = Incidents 
    PRM1   PRM2   PRM3   PRM3a   PRM3b   PRM4   PRM5   NBRM6  
  b/se/p   b/se/p   b/se/p   b/se/p   b/se/p   b/se/p   b/se/p   b/se/p  
 incidents                  
HHI   -9.09e-04***  -6.46e-04***  -6.34e-04***  -6.33e-04***  -6.24e-04***  -5.77e-04***  -5.76e-04***  -5.19e-04*** 
 (7.24e-05)   (7.34e-05)   (7.68e-05)   (7.68e-05)   (7.77e-05)   (7.94e-05)   (7.96e-05)   (9.00e-05)  
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00  
Market Size     5.31e-05***  4.00e-05   5.19e-05   1.66e-05   3.18e-05   2.75e-05   2.12e-05  
    (7.10e-06)   (2.69e-05)   (4.31e-05)   (4.04e-05)   (2.75e-05)   (2.77e-05)   (5.30e-05)  
    0.00   0.14   0.23   0.68   0.25   0.32   0.69  
Population       4.94e-08   8.15e-08   -5.38e-08   7.13e-08   8.98e-08   1.83e-07  
      (9.77e-08)   (1.33e-07)   (1.65e-07)   (1.00e-07)   (1.01e-07)   (1.75e-07)  
      0.61   0.54   0.74   0.48   0.37   0.29  
Population (over 65 years))        -6.28e-07          
        (1.77e-06)          
        0.72          
Population (Medicare eligible)          1.47e-06        
          (1.90e-06)        
          0.44        
Per Capita Income            2.46e-05*   2.66e-05*   2.74e-05  
            (1.08e-05)   (1.09e-05)   (1.50e-05)  
            0.02   0.02   0.07  
Log(Law Effective Days)              -3.51e-02   -3.39e-02  
              (2.24e-02)   (2.60e-02)  
              0.12   0.19  
vce   oim   oim   oim   oim   oim   oim   oim   oim  
N   380   380   380   380   380   380   380   380  
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Robustness 
As mentioned earlier, mean estimates from Poisson MLE are robust to distributional assumptions. Table 
5 provide further evidence of functional form robustness of our results. In model PRM8 and model 
NBRM9, we include a quadratic control variable by adding +,- . Model PRM10 includes 
indicator variables for US geographical states where the highest percentage of CBSA population resides, 
but drops Law Effective Days (due to linear dependence). We do not show the estimates for the indicator 
variables in Table 2 to conserve space. Finally, OLS11 estimates a log-linear model using Ordinary Least 
Squares, with EF0 as the dependent variable. 
  
Table  5: DV=Log(Incidents) for OLS, DV=Incidents for Other Models  
    PRM8   NBRM9   PRM10   OLS11  
  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
 main          
HHI   -4.56e-04***  -3.89e-04***  -5.03e-04***  -1.52e-04*  
  (8.55e-05)   (9.32e-05)   (9.73e-05)   (6.83e-05)  
Size   1.65e-04**   1.92e-04*   3.20e-04***  4.87e-04**  
  (5.48e-05)   (7.71e-05)   (7.99e-05)   (1.82e-04)  
Size Squared  -1.96e-09**   -3.15e-09**   -3.49e-09***  -1.37e-08*** 
  (6.87e-10)   (1.08e-09)   (9.29e-10)   (2.69e-09)  
Population   -8.41e-08   2.43e-08   -3.85e-07*   8.95e-07*  
  (1.15e-07)   (1.79e-07)   (1.78e-07)   (4.48e-07)  
Per Capita 
Income 
 2.60e-05*   2.33e-05   5.90e-06   1.25e-05  
  (1.12e-05)   (1.50e-05)   (1.41e-05)   (2.47e-05)  
Log(Law 
Effective 
Days) 
 -3.56e-02   -3.48e-02     -3.65e-02  
  (2.26e-02)   (2.60e-02)     (3.94e-02)  
vce   oim   oim   oim   ols  
N   380   380   380   380  
  
Looking at Table 5, we again find that an increase in HHI (i.e. market concentration) is correlated with a 
decrease in the average count of data breaches. The results are economically and statistically significant in 
both linear and non-linear models. 
Alternate Models at CBSA-level 
To further examine the association between competition and data protection practices, we estimate 
models where the dependent variable is different from the our main models (see Section Main Results). 
Specifically, we use either Incident, or Severity, or Number of Records as dependent variable in the 
models that appear in the current section.  If our main result holds, we expect to find that these 
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alternative models will also suggest an association between higher competition and lower data security 
quality. 
Association between the Odds of an Incident and HHI 
 We first look at the likelihood of the occurence of a data breach incident in a CBSA. We expect to find that 
increasing HHI (i.e. lower competition) is associated with a lower likelihood of data breaches (higher data 
security quality). We examined the association of the odds of a data breach incident occuring in a CBSA 
and HHI using a logit model. Table 4 summarizes the results of the estimated model. The estimates 
suggest that an increase of 100 point in HHI is associated with a decrease of 2.6% in the odds of an 
incident occuring in the CBSA. We used a robust cluster variance estimator, where the clustering was 
done on the geographical states. The estimate for HHI are not statistically significant at the 5% level, 
although the p-value is just 6%.  The association is consistent with our main results i.e. increase in 
competition is correlated with a decline in the quality of data protection practices. 
Association between Number of Records Breached and HHI 
Next, we look at the association between the number of records breached and HHI. While all breaches are 
unacceptable, some breaches are worse than other due to larger number of records breached. Although 
number of records breached are counts and a Poisson regression model may seem natural, we can 
approximate using a normal distribution due to the high average count. Thus, we use a linear specification 
with log of the number of records breached as the dependent variable. We used Ordinary Least Squares 
with robust cluster variance estimator, with CBSA as the cluster variable. Table 6 summarizes the model 
estimates.    
The coefficient on HHI is statistically significant and the magnitude suggests that a 100 points increase in 
HHI is associated with an approximately 25% decrease in the number of records breached (ceteris 
paribus). A clarification about sample size is in order - we deleted6 24 observations where the number of 
records breached was missing in the original data set. Therefore, the sample size is G 	 354 rather than 
G 	 380 as in the earlier models. 
Association between Severity and HHI 
Finally we look at the association between severity of breach and HHI, where severity was defined earlier 
(see subsection Error! Reference source not found.). The dependent variable for this model is the 
ordinal variable Severity.  We estimate an ordered logistic model to measure the association between the 
severity of breaches and HHI. The robust cluster variance estimator uses CBSA for clustering. Table 7 
summarizes the estimated model.   The coefficient on HHI imply a multiplicative factor of approximately 
0.97.  The interpretation would be that a 100-point increase in HHI is associated with a 3% decrease in a 
J 	 3 incident vs. J K 3 incident. Again, we find that an increase in competition is 
associated with a decrease in the quality of data protection practices. 
 
                                                             
6We deleted observations with missing data rather than using imputation methods. 
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Table  5: Incident Logit (CBSA) 
 LOGIT   
 b p factor 
incident    
HHI (by 100) -2.62e-02 0.06 0.97415 
Size (by 100) 5.01e-03 0.77 1.00502 
Population (by 
1000) 
1.63e-
03** 
0.00  
Per Capita Income -2.42e-02 0.34  
vce cluster   
N 380   
 
Table  6: Number of Records 
Breached (CBSA) 
 OLS  
 b p 
HHI (by 100) -2.52e-01*** 0.00 
Size (by 100) -1.14e-01 0.64 
Population (by 1000) 1.42e-02 0.05 
Per Capita Income 4.72e-01 0.12 
Law Effective Days 1.02e-03 0.64 
vce cluster  
N 354  
 
 
Table  7: Severity (CBSA)  
    OLOGIT        
  b   se  p  factor 
 severity          
HHI (by 100)  -2.98e-02*   (1.34e-02)  0.03  0.97065 
Size (by 100)  1.58e-02   (1.97e-02)  0.42  1.01593 
Population 
(by 1000) 
 2.25e-04   (4.14e-04)  0.59   
Per Capita 
Income 
 3.15e-02   (2.31e-02)  0.17   
Law Effective 
Days 
 1.42e-04   (2.34e-04)  0.54   
cut1          
Constant   2.09e+00*   (9.00e-01)  0.02   
cut2          
Constant   2.36e+00**   (9.00e-01)  0.01   
vce   cluster        
N   354        
  
Alternate Models at Hospital-level 
As our final set of models, we investigate the association between HHI and the quality of data protection 
by using hospitals as the unit of our analysis. By analyzing at the hospital-level, we are better able to 
control for hospital specific heterogeneity. As mentioned earlier, we have two sources for hospital level 
variables viz. AHA annual survey and HIMSS 2009 Analytics Database. We merge AHA and HIMSS data 
on Medicare number, which results in the loss of hundreds of observations. Finally, there are missing 
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entries for Information Systems department full-time employee (FTE) counts, which results in further 
loss of observations in the models that follow. 
If more competition is indeed associated with lower IT security quality, then we would find the odds of a 
breach to be higher in more competitive markets. To investitage this, we estimate the odds of a breach at a 
hospital given the HHI for the CBSA (and other control variables) using logit models. Table 8 summarizes 
the estimates for a number of logit models. We used a robust cluster variance estimator, where the 
clustering was done on the CBSA. In addition for the control variables shown in Table 8, we also control 
for hospital ownership type, hospital system membership, and hospital JCAHO7 accreditation status. 
Except for model L1, the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant and cannot be used for 
general inference. As descriptive statistic for the given sample, all models suggest a negative association 
between HHI and the odds of a breach occuring at a hospital. 
Table  8: Incident Logit (Hospital)  
    L1  L2  L3  L4  L5  L6 
  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
 incident              
HHI (by 
100) 
 -1.82e-02  -7.37e-03  -1.27e-02  -1.15e-02  -1.08e-02  -1.64e-02 
  (6.83e-03)  (7.17e-03)  (7.62e-03)  (7.60e-03)  (1.10e-02)  (1.11e-02) 
CBSA Size 
(by 100) 
   -2.91e-03  -8.07e-04  -4.55e-03  -1.12e-02  -1.31e-02 
    (4.83e-03)  (4.70e-03)  (4.62e-03)  (8.81e-03)  (1.02e-02) 
Population 
(by 1000) 
   1.95e-04  2.74e-04  2.03e-04  3.17e-05  -1.91e-04 
    (1.14e-04)  (1.10e-04)  (9.76e-05)  (2.17e-04)  (2.41e-04) 
Population 
(> 65, by 
1000) 
   -1.21e-03  -2.43e-03  -6.18e-04  3.30e-03  5.49e-03 
    (1.19e-03)  (1.55e-03)  (1.46e-03)  (2.97e-03)  (3.21e-03) 
Income (by 
1000) 
   2.25e-02  1.10e-02  5.31e-03  6.68e-03  -2.85e-02 
    (1.23e-02)  (1.25e-02)  (1.21e-02)  (1.76e-02)  (3.17e-02) 
System Size 
(in CBSA) 
   5.74e-04  1.31e-04  6.79e-05  2.15e-04  4.81e-04 
    (1.34e-04)  (1.57e-04)  (1.74e-04)  (1.91e-04)  (1.88e-04) 
Hospital Size 
(by 100) 
     2.99e-01  2.43e-01  2.46e-01  2.63e-01 
      (3.76e-02)  (4.87e-02)  (7.13e-02)  (1.24e-01) 
                                                             
7``An independent, not-for-profit organization, The Joint Commission accredits and certifies more than 19,000 
health care organizations and programs in the United States. Joint Commission accreditation and certification is 
recognized nationwide as a symbol of quality that reflects an organization’s commitment to meeting certain 
performance standards'' (Source: 
http://www.jointcommission.org/about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx, accessed on Jan 03, 2012). 
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Number of 
FTE 
       1.55e-04  3.72e-05  -6.86e-05 
        (5.73e-05)  (6.68e-05)  (1.89e-04) 
FTE in IS           3.25e-03  8.49e-03 
          (1.36e-03)  (3.62e-03) 
FTE in IS 
Security 
           8.74e-02 
            (7.64e-02) 
FTE in EMR 
Support 
           -2.46e-02 
            (9.91e-03) 
Intercept   -2.79e+00  -4.08e+00  -5.64e+00  -4.99e+00  -3.76e+00  -2.67e+00 
  (1.61e-01)  (4.70e-01)  (7.48e-01)  (8.16e-01)  (7.45e-01)  (1.14e+00) 
  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02 
VCE   cluster  cluster  cluster  cluster  cluster  cluster 
N   4040  4040  4040  2646  995  562 
  
Evidence on Higher Observable Quality in Competitive Market 
To expain the observed association of better data security quality with less competitive markets, we have 
profferred that hospitals in competitive markets may shift resources towards activities whose quality is 
more easily observable to the consumers. Objectively measuring overall hospital quality is not easy and 
healthcare researchers have usually focused on the outcomes related to very specific ailments such as 
pneumonia or acute myocardial infarction. Instead of focusing on the outcome of specific ailments, we 
instead investigate the relation between HHI and highly-visible and costly quality signals such as 
existence of a residency program, medical school affiliation, and membership in the Council of Teaching 
Hospitals (COTH). Since the observed output variables (medical school affiliation and so on) are binary in 
nature, it is natural to model the odds of participation (success) through a logit specification. 
Table 9 summarizes the estimates, where Models Q1, Q2, and Q3 have existence of residency program, 
medical school affiliation, and COTH membership as output variables. We include the usual controls but 
focus on the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient of HHI in these models. For all of these 
models, we find that more competitive markets are associated with higher odds of success on these binary 
variables of highly visible quality signals. 
While these models do not offer conclusive proof of our resource shifting hypothesis, the associations 
suggested by models Q1, Q2, and Q3 along with the theoretical models from extant literature8 add to the 
plausbility of our argument. 
   
Table  9: Observed Hospital Quality versus HHI 
    Q1  Q2  Q3 
  b/se  b/se  b/se 
 main        
                                                             
8Dorfman-Steiner condition and Dranove-Satterthwaite model, see (Gaynor  2006). 
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HHI (by 100)  -2.00e-02  -1.48e-02  -2.85e-02 
  (3.87e-03)  (3.31e-03)  (7.27e-03) 
CBSA Size (by 100)  9.58e-03  9.20e-03  6.52e-03 
  (2.71e-03)  (2.53e-03)  (3.91e-03) 
Population (by 1000)  -1.59e-04  -2.41e-04  -1.23e-04 
  (8.21e-05)  (7.66e-05)  (1.22e-04) 
Population (> 65, by 1000)  -1.81e-03  -8.14e-04  -9.39e-04 
  (9.97e-04)  (9.22e-04)  (1.52e-03) 
Income (by 1000)  3.39e-02  3.35e-02  3.39e-02 
  (7.30e-03)  (6.86e-03)  (1.08e-02) 
Hospital Size (by 100)  6.07e-01  5.84e-01  6.21e-01 
  (2.63e-02)  (2.58e-02)  (3.07e-02) 
Owner Type   -3.98e-01  -3.63e-01  -4.05e-01 
  (4.44e-02)  (4.12e-02)  (6.81e-02) 
Intercept   -1.99e+00  -1.76e+00  -3.68e+00 
  (3.18e-01)  (2.95e-01)  (4.98e-01) 
N   4040  4040  4040 
  
 
Conclusion 
We find a robust association between increase in competition and decrease in the quality of patient data 
protection practices. We find the association to hold at: 
   
Unit of Analysis: CBSA-level analyis or hospital-level analysis  
Outcome Measure:  Count of incidents, odd of an incident, severity of breach, number of records breached  
Functional Forms:  Model specification was driven by the dependent variable but we used different 
functional forms in our specification  
 
Our main result indicates that a 100-point increase in HHI is associated with approximately 5% decline in 
the average count of data breach incidents at the CBSA level. We find statistically and economically 
significant support of this finding through a number of other models that we report in this article. 
As explanation for our finding, we posit that hospitals in competitive markets may shift resources to more 
visible activities (such as medical and hotel services) away from less visible activities such as data security. 
In doing so, the hospitals may increase the risk of data breaches. We find support for this resource 
shifting explanation both from economic theory (Dorfman-Steiner condition) and from empirical research 
(Mukamel 2002). We also find some support for our resource shifting hypothesis from the data as we 
observe hospital in more competitive markets (ceteris paribus) to have higher likelihood of costly high 
quality signals such as residency programs, medical school affiliation, and membership in Council of 
Teaching Hospitals (COTH). 
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Our finding may have interesting policy implications. The extant policy has been to let hospitals decide on 
the level of data security investments and only penalize when a data breach is reported. Although not 
without its own complications and unintended effects, an alternate policy route would be to require 
certification to a minimum level of compliance to data protection practice. 
Our finding may also have indirect implications for general managers and IT managers. While firms in 
competitive markets may be maximizing profits in expectation, they may be miscalculating the risks of a 
future breach and thus underinvesting in IT and data security. This may open firms to future losses that 
have not been correctly anticipated. 
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